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Corporate governance has for a long time been a controversial subject and this 
controversy is glaringly evident in the determination and disclosure of director 
remuneration. One of the first times the controversy of director remuneration reared its 
head was during the financial crisis of 2008 which was described as the biggest 
financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930’s1. The Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)2 and the United Nations body United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)3 both cited failures in 
corporate governance, the practices of director remuneration and inadequate regulation 
and control thereof, as specific causes of the financial crises of 2008. The reason for 
this is that remuneration systems employed by companies failed to sufficiently align 
remuneration packages of directors with the strategy, risk appetite and long-terms 
interests of the company and shareholders.4 The controversy arose when even though 
many companies failed or showed great losses, directors were still paid out excessive 
bonuses and were considered to be rewarded for failure.5 This controversy was caused 
by the failure of corporate governance systems to effectively regulate and enforce 
company remuneration practices, the adequate disclosure of information regarding 
director remuneration, and the lack of shareholder input in the determination of director 
remuneration and bonuses. In addition is the fact that most corporate governance 
systems are based on a ‘comply or explain’ or ‘apply or explain’ approach which, 
despite its advantages, renders the application of corporate governance structures 
voluntary, or at a minimum, non-compliance could be explained away. 
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This dissertation examines a weakness in the corporate governance structures of South 
Africa regarding the disclosure director remuneration in the context of mergers and 
acquisitions. The submission is that directors act in their own interests; that they benefit 
more from mergers and acquisitions than the company and its shareholders vis-à-vis 
short and long term incentives, contrary to the fiduciary duty owed to the latter; and 
posits that the current corporate governance system in South Africa, its disclosure 
requirements, and its application are insufficient.  
The first section of this dissertation briefly describes the history of corporate governance 
in South Africa from the first King Code of 1994 to its most recent rendition, the King III 
Code. It includes a discussion of the reasons advanced for its existence, its theoretical 
underpinnings, and its method of application being the ‘apply or explain’ approach. 
The second section discusses director remuneration. It discusses the agency problem 
which is the theoretical basis for the problem under discussion. 
The third section discusses the development of the remuneration committee in South 
Africa through the King Codes including the developed terms of reference, 
recommended structure of remuneration packages, and finally the disclosure 
requirements. 
The fourth section discusses mergers and acquisitions, providing a definition, reasons 
why companies engage in mergers and acquisitions, and providing the most common 
reasons for the failure thereof. 
The fifth section discusses event studies which necessitates an economic examination 
as to the effects of mergers and acquisitions on the share prices of the companies 
engaging in such activities. A comparison of the findings of local studies is made to 
international studies to illustrate that the findings are not a remote or local phenomenon 
but an international and well documented finding which corporate governance measures 
have seemed to ignore, or at the very least failed to address sufficiently. 
Finally, a summation follows and recommendations are made to strengthen the 
corporate governance structures to mitigate the excessive benefits accruing to directors 
and align South Africa’s corporate governance structures with international trends. 
1. Brief history of corporate governance in South Africa 
During the early nineteen nineties South African corporations where isolated from the 
international economy and characterized by poor corporate governance owing to the 
apartheid regime and the prevalence of family owned companies.6 As a result of the 
political isolation, corporate practices, rules, norms and legislation fell behind and where 
outdated.7 Since the country obtained independence in 1994, the country had been re-
insinuated into the world economy and was forced to transform its commercial 
environment to keep abreast with international trends and attract foreign investment. 
South Africa joined the World Trade Organisation on 1 January 19958 and implemented 
various mechanisms to improve corporate governance, including legislation such as the 
Insider Trading Act no. 153 of 1998, publication of the voluntary King Report followed by 
two more publications of the King Report which eventually became a listing requirement 
for the JSE and the AltX, and the enactment of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
The first King Report was released in 1994 and was the product of committee convened 
by the Institute of Directors chaired by Mervyn King9 and had as its purpose the 
publication of a code of corporate governance, practice and conduct. The underlying 
aim of the Code was to improve corporate governance with a view to achieving a single 
bottom line: maximization of profits for shareholders.10 The code was to incorporate 
international trends and best practice, drawing extensively from the United Kingdom’s 
Cadbury Report11, whilst having regard to the South African context and the underlying 
value of shareholder primacy. Various task groups were formed to consider different 
aspects of corporate governance such as stakeholder communication, executive 
responsibility regarding the frequency, substance and form of information to 
shareholders.12 There was a focus in the King Report, as with the Cadbury Report, on 
disclosure of information to shareholders to enable them to oversee the board of a 
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company through exercising their votes.13 The Report also provided for the creation of 
certain committees such as audit and importantly, remuneration committees.14 The 
downfall of the Report was that it was essentially voluntary and were at the crux mere 
recommendations which were put to companies but could be explained away in annual 
reports which, it was submitted, was never or rarely done to begin with.15 Similarly to 
international conventions, the King Report of 1994 was a form of “soft law” which had no 
teeth and could be ignored. Although the King Report of 1994 had its disadvantages, it 
did make an important contribution, as stated in the King Report of 2002, in that it 
“formalized the need for companies to recognize that they no longer act independently 
from the societies and the environment in which they operate”.16 It created public 
awareness as to the issues surrounding corporate governance and alerted companies 
and the broader stakeholders that companies are not creatures that operate in isolation 
but that their actions and conduct have consequences that not only affect the company 
itself and its shareholders but the whole society and environment in which it operates. 
The King Committee was reconvened in 2000 to revise and update the King Report of 
1994 according to new prevailing international trends and to stay abreast of the 
changes that occurred internationally, given the emerging markets crisis in the latter 
part of the 1990’s. During this period, a number of significant legislative steps had been 
taken to improve and strengthen corporate governance in South Africa. Amoung the 
legislative enactments were; the Labour Relations Act (1995), the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act (1997), Employment Equity Act (1998), the National Environmental 
Management Act (1998), the updated JSE listing requirements, various amendments to 
the Companies Act (1973), and various updates and new acts regulating corporate 
governance of public and government institutions.17 What these legislative actions 
indicated was a real and serious commitment to align South Africa’s corporate practices 
to international best practice and hinted towards the inevitable philosophical direction in 
which corporate governance was heading, being a broader stakeholder inclusive model 
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as opposed to a value-for-shareholder based approach to corporate governance. The 
King II report acknowledged that there was a worldwide shift towards the ‘triple bottom 
line’ which incorporated economic, environmental, and social aspects of a company’s 
activities.18 In the introduction to the King Report of 2002, seven characteristics of good 
corporate governance were enumerated according to international best practice and 
emerging trends which were Discipline, Transparency, Independence, Accountability, 
Responsibility, Fairness, and Social Responsibility. The most relevant characteristics for 
the purposes of this dissertation will be described briefly below. 
The first characteristic was ‘Discipline’ which meant a commitment by senior 
management to ‘adhere to behavior that is universally recognized and accepted to be 
correct and proper’.19 This, along with the characteristic of Social Responsibility, 
signaled the importance and introduction of the concepts of corporate citizenry and an  
‘inclusive model’ to corporate governance. Secondly, was the characteristic of 
‘transparency’ which was aimed at not only a disclosure of economic aspects of the 
company, but also non-financial aspects of the company. The Report recommended 
reporting on issues ‘associated with social and ethical accounting, auditing and 
reporting, and safety, health and the environment’.20 The purpose of such transparent 
reporting was described in the Report as ‘a measure of how good management is at 
making necessary information available in a candid, accurate and timely 
manner…including general reports and press releases’.21 The underlying purpose was 
to enable ‘investors to obtain a true picture of what is happening inside the company’.22 
These to characteristics also formed part of the back-bone to the guiding principles for 
the review of the 1994 King Report.23 
The Draft Code of Governance Principles for South Africa was issued in February 
2009,24 with the final Code being published in September of the same year, in 
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anticipation of the then new Companies Act of 2008, which was to enter into operation 
in 2010,25 and changes in international corporate governance, developments and 
trends.26 The King III Code’s underlying philosophy revolved around issues of 
leadership, corporate citizenship and sustainability.27 The key conceptual drivers behind 
the Code was firstly, the ‘Triple Context’ within which companies operate, being the 
social, environmental, and economic contexts.28 A second driver was that of 
Sustainability,29 not only in terms of the environmental aspect, but also economic aspect 
was emphasized. As international trends and findings suggest, the economic success of 
a company is inextricably linked to issues of sustainability in the environmental context, 
and a more philosophical concept of the word, such as being more conscious of the 
long-term longevity of the company as opposed to chasing short-term gain, assessing 
strategy and risk with a view to longevity, and even gearing remuneration packages to 
motivate long-term sustainable performance. Sustainability was to inform all conduct 
and policies of the company, for its own benefit and also the benefit of the broader 
stakeholder, adopting a ‘stakeholder inclusive approach’.30 This ‘stakeholder inclusive’ 
approach was the third driver of the Code. This approach meant that all stakeholders in 
a company, to put it simply, being anyone affected by the actions of the company such 
as the environment, the community in which it operates, employees etc. should be 
considered within the context of the best interests of the company.31 This meant that the 
shareholders no longer formed the primary concern of the company and are essentially 
included as a stakeholder to be considered when determining a course of action in the 
best interests of the company. This gave effect to the concept of companies being 
corporate citizens having lasting positive effects for all stakeholders.32 The third 
conceptual driver the Code placed emphasis on was Integrated Reporting which meant 
that the company was no longer required to merely report on financial data which is 
considered to be a photograph of the company’s financial position at a particular point in 
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26 Institute of Directors in Southern Africa – The Draft Code (2009) page 6. 
27 Institute of Directors in Southern Africa – The Draft Code (2009) page 10. 
28 Institute of Directors in Southern Africa – The Draft Code (2009) page 12. 
29 Institute of Directors in Southern Africa – The Draft Code (2009) page 12. 
30 Institute of Directors in Southern Africa – The Draft Code (2009) page 12. 
31 Institute of Directors in Southern Africa – The Draft Code (2009) page 13. 
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time33 but other aspects described as Environmental, Social, and Governance issues 
(ESG)34 which provides the potential investor and stakeholder with insight into a 
company which a balance sheet or profit and loss statement could not provide. It has 
the advantage of improving risk management, increasing business opportunities, 
instilling external trust and confidence in the directors, and enhancing the company’s 
transparency, goodwill, and reputation.35 It enables a company to disclose the positive 
and negative impacts it has had on society and provide a platform for the company to 
report on how it intends to mitigate the negatives and improve or sustain the positives,36 
and finally provides a written statement to which shareholders can hold the directors of 
a company accountable to. 
Finally, the last major conceptual driver of the Code is that of the compliance approach 
adopted, being an ‘apply or explain’ approach, as opposed to the ‘comply or explain’ 
approach adopted in the King Code of 2002. Compliance with corporate governance 
frameworks has always been a point of contention in that where mere recommendations 
are made, the force and effect of the framework can be easily vitiated or evaded, but on 
the other hand a compulsory legislated system becomes inflexible as corporate 
governance is a liquid concept constantly changing, and no one set of rules can apply to 
all companies thus making compliance costly and often irrelevant to a specific 
business.37 The main international example of a country adopting a legislated corporate 
governance framework is the United States of America with its Sarbanes-Oxley Act.38 
This type of regime is commonly referred to as a ‘comply or else’ approach39 which 
carries with it legal sanctions for non-compliance. In its arguments against adopting 
such an approach, the committee referenced the cost of compliance of a specific 
section in the Act at $264 billion 40 and total compliance with the Act of approximately 
                                            
33 Institute of Directors in Southern Africa – The Draft Code (2009) page 13. 
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36 Institute of Directors in Southern Africa – The Draft Code (2009) page 13. 
37 Institute of Directors in Southern Africa – The Draft Code (2009) page 5. 
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the combined debt write-off of Enron, World Com, and Tyco.41 The King Committee 
further opined that having one framework to apply to all companies was logically 
impossible as businesses vary from one another to such a large degree,42 in the their 
industrial requirements, the types of business operations, their specific needs and 
requirements, business drivers, and what each company needs to focus on at a 
particular point in time. Therefore, what may be applicable to one company may be 
totally irrelevant to another, however the latter must expend time and money to ensure 
compliance or face legal sanction. 
The other approach to compliance is a voluntary approach which is followed by South 
Africa, the United Kingdom with its UK Corporate Governance Code of 201243 and 
various European Union member states44. This voluntary approach is referred to as the 
‘comply or explain’ approach as opposed to ‘comply or else’.45 Although the application 
of the Code is voluntary, many of the recommendations put forward in the King Code of 
2002 had been legislated into the Companies Act of 2008. Additionally the adoption of 
the King Code is a requirement for companies intending to list on the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange (JSE) and the AltX which is a division of the JSE aimed at providing a 
trading platform for ‘small and medium-sized high-growth companies’.46 These 
measures give the Code more force and effect especially regarding the larger 
companies that are listed on the JSE or AltX or those companies intending to list. 
The ‘comply or explain’ evolved into further different approaches. For example when the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development had to decide whether their 
corporate governance code entitled, ‘Guidance on Good Practices in Corporate 
Governance Disclosure’47 should be on the ‘comply or else’, ‘comply or explain’, ‘apply 
or explain’, or ‘adopt or explain’ basis they decided in favour of the latter.48 South Africa 
adopted the ‘apply or explain’ approach as it was thought that this approach was more 
                                            
41 Institute of Directors in Southern Africa (2009) page 6. 
42 Institute of Directors in Southern Africa (2009) page 6. 
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44 Institute of Directors in Southern Africa (2009) page 6. 
45 Institute of Directors in Southern Africa (2009) page 6. 
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47 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Guidance on Good Practices in Corporate 
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48 Institute of Directors in Southern Africa (2009) page 7. 
in line with the spirit and object of the King Code in that the directors of companies 
would have to apply their minds to the principles and recommendations to determine its 
relevance to the company rather than a ‘check-the-box’ approach to complying to 
principles.49 It allows the directors of company a certain degree of flexibility in that 
instead of mindlessly complying with a recommendation, the board could follow a 
principle and apply it differently to still achieve the result.50 To use a rudimentary 
illustrative example, a recommendation with purpose of achieving gender equality could 
be to hire an equal number of men and women. A company could ‘check the box’ and 
hire an equal number of male and female employees, but remunerate the males more 
advantageously although still complying with the letter of the recommendation. Whereas 
if the underlying principle of gender equality were applied, the company could, even 
though there are more male employees (for example because of operational 
requirements) remunerate female employees equally for equal work, or have a policy of 
considering females first for promotion to management positions. In the latter instance 
the underlying objective of gender equality is achieved, although not the numerical 
objective and requires more active and considered thought by directors as the aim of a 
recommendation. In essence, the difference between ‘comply or explain’ and ‘apply or 
explain’ is that of substance over form. 
 
2. Director’s Remuneration 
Director’s remuneration has long since been a controversial issue both locally and 
internationally. Director remuneration has gained a great deal more attention and 
scrutiny since the global financial crisis of 2008 where many large companies failed but 
directors and managers of failed companies were still paid substantial bonuses and 
seen to be rewarded for failure.51 The Australian Government Productivity Commission 
pointed in 2009 that ‘internationally, various forums have identified remuneration 
practices as a contributing factor to the global financial crisis. Strong growth in executive 
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remuneration from 1990s to 2007, and instances of large payments despite poor 
company performance, have fuelled community concerns that executive remuneration is 
out of control.’52 Former minister of finance, Trevor Manuel, intimated similar opinions in 
an interview with the Financial Mail when he stated that the Government was concerned 
about excessive remuneration in relation to poor performance of executives and stated 
that some of the salaries were ‘unjustified’ and even ‘repulsive’ in the context of South 
Africa’s high unemployment and inequality.53 
Companies have been in existence for centuries, but it is submitted that it was only with 
the establishment of public companies and the first stock exchange in 1856 when a 
different breed of manager became necessary to advance the interests of 
shareholders.54 Although the precise legal relationship between the director and the 
company is subject to debate, it is submitted that the most appropriate defining 
relationship is that of Agency.55 In terms of Agency, directors or managers act as agents 
for the shareholders as their principals. Such a relationship comes into being when one 
person, the principal, hires another, the agent, to represent his or her interests56 which 
is analogous to the director-shareholder relationship. In such a relationship a possibility 
arises that a conflict of interest between the principal and agent arises; this problem is 
known as the ‘agency problem’.57 Essentially this conflict of interest boils down to the 
agent acting in a self-interested manner pursuing his own interests, as opposed to 
acting in the interests of the shareholder principals. This conflict of interest carries with it 
a cost to the company referred to as ‘agency cost’.58 Agency costs can be indirect or 
direct with an example of the former being where management declines to exploit an 
opportunity causing a loss of opportunity.59 The latter takes two forms; the first being 
                                            
52 Australian Government Productivity Commission Executive Remuneration in Australia (2009) Inquiry 
Report No. 49, 19 December 2009. 
53 Financial Mail. Executive Pay – Is Intervention Required? 2 August 2008. 
http://www.leader.co.za/article.aspx?s=1&f=1&a=825 (accessed 11 August 2014) 
54H.E. Scholtz & A. Smit Executive Remuneration and Company Performance for South African 
Companies List on the Alternative Exchange (AltX) (2012) Southern African Business Review. Vol. 16, 
No. 1. Page 22. 
55 F. Cassim (2012) pages 411 - 414. 
56 Stephen A. Ross et al Corporate Finance 10ed (2013) page 13. 
57 Stephen A. Ross et al (2013) page 13. 
58 Stephen A. Ross et al (2013) page 14. 
59 Stephen A. Ross et al (2013) page 14. 
direct corporate expenditure that benefits management but not the shareholders such 
as performance bonuses and fringe benefits.60 The second form results from expenses 
incurred in monitoring the actions of management such as payment of independent 
auditors61 and the cost of compliance with King III corporate governance measures. The 
remedy recommended to alleviate this agency cost is through the remuneration 
package of the agent by granting share options and similar performance based 
incentives to align the interests of the agent with those of the shareholder by granting 
the agent ownership in the company.62 
In contemporary South African commerce and indeed internationally, the task of 
deciding director remuneration theoretically falls to the Remuneration or Compensation 
Committees. These committees are tasked with devising a remuneration policy which 
puts forward recommendations to the board the company as to how to remunerate its 
directors and executives fairly and responsibly, and to assist the board in making 
accurate, complete and transparent disclosure of remuneration practices.63 Factors 
taken into consideration when determining the remuneration of directors or executives 
include the size of the company,64 the need to attract skilled and knowledgeable 
candidates with the requisite expertise, the need to retain existing management and 
potential management through long term incentives, comparative trends in 
remuneration, acceptability of the remuneration package to shareholders, and the short 
and long-term goals of the company amoung others.65 
Remuneration packages typically consist of fees paid for services rendered by directors, 
monthly salary, bonuses, performance-related payments, expense allowances, 
                                            
60 Stephen A. Ross et al (2013) page 14. 
61 Stephen A. Ross et al (2013) page 14. 
62 H.E. Scholtz (2012) Page 25. 
63 Institute of Directors King III Chapter 2 Practice Notes: Remuneration Committee Terms of Reference 
(2009) Page 2. 
64 Paul Guest The Impact of Mergers and Acquisitions on Executive Pay in the United Kingdom (2007) 
University of Cambridge Centre for Business Research, Working Paper No. 354. Page 1; Sourafel Girma, 
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65 Dr. Philip Theunissen Remuneration and Benefits Review of State Owned Enterprises (2010) page 3. 
contributions to any pension or retirement scheme, the value of any option or right 
granted to a director in respect of  share of a company, or any financial assistance.66 
Bonus payments are usually cash payments linked to short term targets.67 Examples of 
performance indicators are; number of units sold, number of units produced, cost of 
production per unit, profit per annum, market share etc. the list is endless and is geared 
for each business’s financial needs and requirements. The payment of rewards in terms 
of the achievement short term targets are usually assessed and reviewed annually.68 
Long term incentives, on the other hand, are usually share-based awards.69 The 
purpose of this threefold. Firstly, to align the interests of directors to those of the 
shareholder, mitigating the agency problem outlined above. Secondly, to retain the 
director as the bonuses usually accrue and vest in the director after a specific number of 
years70. And finally, to motivate the director to strive to create actual shareholder value, 
as the awards are usually linked to the performance of the shares. 
The most commonly used long term incentive takes the form of share options. Share 
options granted under company share option schemes as a reward for achieving certain 
long term targets, both financial and non-financial.71 A share option is an option or right 
granted to its holder to purchase shares at a pre-determined price, referred to as the 
strike price. The holder is not obliged to exercise the option and if not exercised within 
the specific time period, the option will lapse. As an example, a director may be granted 
100 000 share options at a strike price of R50.00 per share (to a total value of R5 
million) which is the current market price per share. The option is exercisable from three 
years from the date of the grant and is valid for a period of two years thereafter. Upon 
the arrival of the option grant date, the market value of the shares is R70.00 (to a total 
value of R7 million), however the director is entitled to purchase the shares at R50.00. 
The director can exercise his option to purchase and sell the shares immediately and 
make a personal profit of R2 million. The director can finance the purchase himself or 
                                            
66 Companies Act No. 71 of 2008, Section 30(6). 
67 The Institute of Directors of Southern Africa – The Practice Note (2012) Practice note 157.1 (ii). 
68 The Institute of Directors of Southern Africa – The Practice Note (2012) Practice note 158.3. 
69 The Institute of Directors of Southern Africa – The Practice Note (2012) Practice note 157.1 (iii). 
70 The Institute of Directors of Southern Africa – The Report (2009) Practice Recommendation 168. 
71 The Institute of Directors of Southern Africa – The Practice Note (2012) Practice note 154.1 
obtain short-term financing from the company and repay it with the profits.72The use of 
share options has the effect of imputing a personal interest to the director thereby 
motivating the director to maximize the increase in the share price thereby creating 
shareholder value and creating profit and value for himself. 
The danger in granting awards based on performance, both long and short term, is that 
they often overlap. The King Code does warn against this73 however, as will be 
illustrated in due course, this is an increasingly difficult task in the context of mergers 
and acquisitions, and the provisions regarding disclosure are insufficient and do not 
provide enough guidance to prevent directors from acquiring unearned benefits. 
 
3. Development of the Remuneration Committee 
One of the fundamental issues regarding the remuneration of directors and executive 
directors is who determines the remuneration package. In the past, the directors 
determined their own remuneration, which is obviously not sound from a corporate 
governance perspective nor from a business perspective as it would clearly be open to 
easy abuse. Examples of the abuse to which such a system can be subjected to are the 
Regal Treasury Private Bank74 scandal in 2001 where the South African Commission of 
Enquiry discovered that the Chairman of the Board authorised the granting of a cash 
bonus of R2 Million, a tax-free dividend of R650 000.00 and shares to the value of R17 
Million in lieu of a restraint of trade agreement, all without Board approval to the CEO 
who incidentally was also his brother-in-law.75 Further afield, the ENRON scandal, a US 
Senate sub-committee exposed, inter alia, that in one financial year, bonuses of U$750 
million was paid to senior executives whereas the net income of the group for the same 
period amounted to only U$975 million.76 In South Africa, the King Report of 2002 
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recommended that remuneration matters should be considered by a remuneration 
committee which makes recommendations to the board of directors, this was 
supplement and refined by the King III Report and further augmented by the King III 
Practice Note of 2012. 
What follows is a more comprehensive discussion of what a remuneration committee is, 
its functions, its constitution, and their terms of reference in terms of the aforementioned 
codes and reports and specifically of the King III Practice Note of October 2012. 
The King Code of 2002 did not provide for the formation of a remuneration committee 
per se, instead it uses the following phrase in article 2.5.2 of the code that ‘companies 
should appoint a remuneration committee or such other appropriate board committee’.77 
The wording of this phrase is clearly not peremptory, however it goes on to state that 
whatever committee does determine the remuneration of directors should consist of 
‘entirely or mainly of independent non-executive directors, to make recommendations to 
the board within the agreed terms of reference on the company’s framework of 
executive remuneration packages for each of executive directors’.78 This latter 
requirement laid the foundations for the requirements for remuneration committees in 
the Code of 2009. Although the Code of 2002 does not specifically recommend the 
creation of a remuneration committee, it does provide model terms of reference for the 
ideal board committees in Appendix V of the King Report.79 The committee provides a 
caveat and states the terms of reference provided are merely recommendations to 
provide guidance for companies intending to form such committees and that it is up to 
the board to define and develop the terms necessary for the company to meet its own 
unique requirements.80 
In the Appendix to the Code of 2002 it is recommended that ‘every company should 
establish a formal and transparent procedure for developing a policy on executive 
remuneration and for fixing the remuneration packages of individual directors, within 
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agreed terms of reference, to avoid potential conflicts of interest.’81 It recommends that 
the committee be constituted solely or substantially of non-executive directors who are 
to make use of independent surveys and consultants to determine remuneration 
packages which satisfy shareholders as to reasonableness and attract directors of 
sufficient caliber to help the company prosper.82 The remuneration committee was 
recommended to consist of not less than three directors appointed by the board of 
directors of whom all should be independent non-executive directors.83 They should 
additionally appoint a chairperson for the remuneration committee and that the 
chairperson of the board would be eligible if they were also an independent non-
executive director.84 The terms of reference were to determine, agree and develop a 
policy on executive and senior remuneration for specific directors of the company and 
included determining basic salary, benefits, bonuses, performance based incentives, 
share incentives, pensions benefits and the like, and also to determine the criteria and 
standards to measure performance of directors.85 In determining the remuneration 
package for executive directors, the aim and structure of the package should be to 
motivate the directors to enhance the company’s performance and simultaneously 
ensure that the directors are reasonably, fairly, and responsibly rewarded for their 
performance.86 The committee was recommended to co-ordinate with the chairperson of 
the board and the chief executive in determining remuneration packages and the 
company’s remuneration policy.87 As regards the actual remuneration and types of 
remuneration, the forms of payment suggested were cash as base salary, and shares or 
share options to align the interests of the directors with those of the shareholders88 to 
mitigate the agency problem as mentioned earlier. Supplementary fees for work 
resulting from membership of other board committees was allowed provided they are 
charged separately. The committee was tasked to make recommendations on the 
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payment of other benefits such as pension fund contributions, retirement benefits and 
severance payments.89 
Under the Code of 2002 no shareholder input was required and the only 
recommendation was that a company can disclose the remuneration of directors and its 
remuneration policy in the annual report. One must bear in mind that the creation of a 
remuneration committee was voluntary, the structure, constitution and terms of 
reference were provided for in the appendix to code, which spoke to the lax approach or 
non-peremptory nature of the formation of such committee, that the recommendations 
and guidance regarding the actual forms of remuneration was very sparse, shareholder 
approval was not required, and finally that disclosure was not necessarily a requirement 
and dependent on whether the company chose to form such a voluntary committee. 
From this one can ascertain that under the Code of 2002, principles regarding 
remuneration and disclosure were still ill-developed although it was an aspect of serious 
concern in corporate governance internationally as can be seen in the examples of 
abuse of remuneration of directors mentioned earlier. 
Under the current and third rendition of the King Code the provisions dealing with the 
formation of a remuneration committee remained non-peremptory as in King II.90 The 
recommendation for the composition of the committee has also remained the same in 
that it states that the board committees should be composed of a majority of non-
executive independent directors91 as per the King Report and is supplemented by the 
Practice Note in adding that executive directors should only attend meetings on 
invitation92. However, a great deal more emphasis was placed on the Remuneration 
Committee, the determination and disclosure of remuneration and a substantial amount 
of guidance was provided. The Institute of Directors of Southern Africa issued a practice 
note in 2009 entitled ‘Remuneration Committee Terms of Reference’. This practice note 
was essentially a template for the establishment of a Remuneration Committee to be 
adjusted for each company as required. It dealt with the purpose, composition, role, 
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responsibilities, authority, meeting procedures, and the approval of the terms of 
reference of the Remuneration Committee.93 The second practice note issued, entitled 
‘A Guide to the Application of King III: Remuneration’, was issued in 2012. The practice 
notes draw on the principles espoused in King III Code and the practice 
recommendations in the King III Report and provide practical guidance as to how to 
implement the principle.94 The practice note additionally provides a sample 
Remuneration Strategy Framework,95 guidance on the formulation and consideration of 
short term incentive design standards,96 and finally a template for the remuneration 
report97 to be disclosed in the annual financial statements.98 
Under the current regime of corporate governance, including the issued Practice Notes, 
the functions of the Remuneration Committee can be divided into two broad categories. 
The first is the setting and administering of a Remuneration Policy. The second relates 
to disclosure. 
The first function is that of devising a Remuneration Strategy99 to convey the company’s 
philosophy of remunerating directors with the underlying principle of aligning the 
remuneration package with the company’s strategy, risk appetite, shareholder interests, 
and long-term goals. This Remuneration Strategy must be approved by the 
Remuneration Committee and confirmed by the Board.100 The purpose of the 
Remuneration Policy is to give effect to the strategy and deals in greater detail how the 
remuneration packages should be structured.101 The Practice Notes suggest that 
remuneration packages should include a mix of fixed and variable pay to strike a 
balance between the need to motivate directors over the short term, long term, align 
their interests with those of the company and shareholders, and to attract and retain 
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directors of sufficient caliber.102 Within the remuneration policy, the Committee should 
also set incentive targets geared towards the short and long term performance and 
interests of the company and devise measures to effectively measure the performance 
of the directors in that regard.103 The Practice Notes deal extensively with the 
determination of bonuses104 to be related to annual performance target and suggests 
that those targets and related awards be reviewed annually.105 This Remuneration 
Policy is subject to a non-binding advisory vote by the shareholders at the annual 
general meeting of 50%.106 The purpose of this is said to provide the shareholders to 
express their opinion on the structure of remuneration including salary, benefits, and 
short and long term incentives.107 The board is not obliged to consider the outcome of 
the vote. Although the board is not obliged to consider the outcome of the vote, it does 
provide shareholders to express discontent regarding remuneration and may result in 
the board adjusting its remuneration packages. The types of remuneration provided for 
in terms of the Code are normal base salary, short term annual performance bonuses 
which usually take the form of cash, long term incentives which usually take the form of 
share schemes with differing vesting periods to align interests and retain directors, 
pension and other contributions, and severance payments. 
The second function is that of disclosure. This is provided for in principle 2.26 of the 
Code and expanded upon in Practice Recommendations 180 to 182 of the Report and 
notes 180.1 to 182.3 of the Practice Notes. The disclosure of remuneration of directors 
takes place in the Remuneration Report to be included in the Integrated Report,108 
which is to contain base salary, awards, benefits, the value and basis of long and short 
term incentives, the value of all unvested and unexercised awards of stock options and 
those already vested and exercised.109 The notes contain a section of what is to be 
included in the Report such as the objectives the remuneration strategy seeks to 
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achieve, a summary of the guaranteed remuneration packages and short and long term 
incentive schemes, and an explanation of how the incentive schemes are to be 
implemented.110 
When comparing the Code to international corporate governance codes, the 
recommendations in the King Code are largely similar to those put forward by the 
International Corporate Governance Network111 and the UK Corporate Governance 
Code112 regarding the determination of remuneration. A few fundamental differences 
may be pointed. The first is that the UK Corporate Governance Code requires that all 
members of its remuneration committees be independent non-executive directors113 as 
opposed to South Africa’s majority of independent directors. The second is that ICGN is 
opposed to any ‘guaranteed’ elements of remuneration114 whereas the King Code does 
provide for guaranteed elements of remuneration, but wisely excludes long and short 
term incentives.115 Thirdly, while the King Code state that shareholders should not have 
any input regarding the remuneration of executive directors, affording them only a non-
binding advisory vote, the ICGN and the UK Code recommends that any share-based 
remuneration which could result in a dilution of shareholdings should be subjected to 
shareholder approval.116 The United States has similar requirements in terms of its tax 
laws for the approval of any share-based awards or amendments to such schemes.117 
118  
As regards the disclosure of remuneration, the substance of what needs to be disclosed 
in the remuneration report is largely similar between the ICGN, the UK Code, and the 
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King Code. However, in since 1 October 2013, remuneration disclosure in the UK 
became compulsory as required by section 420(1) of the Companies Act 2006 (CA) 
where the contents of the report are prescribed by the Large and Medium-sized 
companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) Regulations 2008. This is similar to the 
position in the United States where the Securities Exchange Commission requires 
disclosure regarding director compensation in a proxy statement provided to the 
shareholders, the annual reports, and registration statements of the company.119 This is 
further supplemented by the Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Act120 which requires 
additional expanded disclosure relating to the remuneration paid compared to the actual 
performance of the company, amoung others. Other countries which have mandatory 
disclosure requirements include Canada, Ireland, France, and Germany. The United 
States has the most stringent, comprehensive, and costly compliance regimes,121 
however it seems that the larger world economies employ a legislated approach to 
disclosure of director remuneration. The ‘apply or explain’ approach to corporate 
governance does have advantages in that it is flexible and subject to easy amendment 
as opposed to the tedious processes of statutory amendment, however as seen with 
King I and King II, important aspects of corporate governance which become standard 
procedure are codified into legislation or regulation. Provisions regarding disclosure 
have been codified in the Companies Act of 2008122 to keep up with international best 
practice and the protection of shareholders through information. However, having more 
stringent disclosure requirements is particularly important in the context of mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A). The King III Report does make provision for the consideration of 
M&A activity in Practice Recommendation 166123 where it states that the ‘Remuneration 
Committee should regularly review incentive schemes to ensure their continued 
contribution to shareholder value…and guard against unjustified windfalls and 
inappropriate gains from the operation of share-based incentives’. It is further 
supplemented by Practice Note 166.1 which acknowledges M&A but in the context of 
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share price variations during announcement and negotiation stages.124 These 
provisions are sufficient to guard against any short term variations in share prices which 
may trigger the activation of bonus provisions, however this is does not guard against 
the long term effects of M&A as shown in the economic evidence on event studies. The 
King Code125, Report126, and Practice Notes127 states that remuneration policies, when 
awarding performance bonuses, should consider the effect of external factors which 
could affect the performance of the company but to which the directors have made no 
contribution to, such as oil, gold or platinum prices.128 This, again, does not mitigate the 
risk alluded to above. Additionally, Practice Note 147.4 states that ‘the company should 
indicate in the Remuneration Report the manner in which director remuneration is 
related to the value-created for shareholders and other stakeholders.’ This dissertation 
submits in this regard, firstly that the value created for shareholders as a result of M&A 
has only been shown to accrue after a period of approximately three years and as a 
result, any short term annual bonuses are not related to value created for shareholders. 
Secondly, that the gains accruing from M&A activity, such as increased production, 
lower cost of production, increased output, increased market share etc. which may 
trigger short term annual performance bonuses, are as a natural consequence of the 
merger or acquisition in and of itself, and not from the conduct of the directors in 
innovating or developing the company’s operations to achieve those results. The gains 
made from M&A are therefore more akin to external factors which should be considered 
when awarding bonuses, and therefore constitute an unjustified award.  
 
4. Mergers and acquisitions: a brief discussion 
 
Companies can achieve growth in two manners; firstly, in the ordinary course of 
business, referred to as internal or organic growth, and secondly through external 
                                            
124 The Institute of Directors of Southern Africa – The Practice Notes (2012) Practice Recommendation 
166.1. 
125 The Institute of Directors of Southern Africa – The Code (2009) Principle 2.25. 
126 The Institute of Directors of Southern Africa – The Report (2009) Practice Recommendation 148. 
127 The Institute of Directors of Southern Africa – The Practice Note (2012) Practice notes 148.1. 
128 The Institute of Directors of Southern Africa – The Practice Note (2012) Practice note 148.1. 
growth by acquiring existing businesses.129 Mergers and acquisitions (M&A), or an 
amalgamation or merger as it is referred to in the Companies Act (the Act), are 
classified as a category of Fundamental Transactions.130 An amalgamation or merger is 
defined in the Act as: 
[A] transaction, or series of transactions, pursuant to an agreement between two 
or more companies, resulting in –  
(a) the formation of one or more new companies, which together hold all of 
the assets and liabilities that were held by any of the amalgamating or 
merging companies immediately before the implementation of the 
agreement, and the dissolution of each of the amalgamating or merging 
companies; or 
(b) the survival of at least one the amalgamating or merging companies, with 
or without the formation of one or more new companies, and the vesting in 
the surviving company or companies, together with such new companies, 
of all of the assets and liabilities that were held by any of the 
amalgamating or merging companies immediately before the 
implementation of the agreement. 
A merger takes place between a target company and an acquiring company, involving a 
process of acquiring, selling, or combining of firms131 resulting in a new company being 
formed or one of the surviving with the other ceasing its existence. This is provided for 
in the definition of an amalgamation or merger in subsections (a) and (b) respectively. 
The choice between the two structures of mergers will depend on the underlying 
reasons for the merger and be determined by a number of factors. Examples of these 
factors are, first, the wish to convey a message that the merger was a transaction 
between equals, necessitating the formation of a new company.132 Second, the need to 
maintain and exploit the goodwill and identity of one the parties to the merger which 
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would necessitate the retention of the relevant company’s name with the other being 
absorbed and dissolved.133 And, provisions in contracts with third parties, such as 
assignment or cession provisions in service agreements, regarding change in control or 
ownership of a contracting party could also determine which company name survives or 
if a new name should be created.134 
The theories as to why companies merge has been thoroughly developed and generally 
be divided into two categories; neoclassical theories and behavioral theories.135 
Neoclassical theories are premised on the assumption that managers are rational and 
make rational decisions to maximize shareholder wealth.136 Behavioral theories are 
premised on the assumption that managers are not rational and act in their own 
interests137 as espoused in the hubris theory and agency theory.  
It has been submitted that amongst the most important neoclassical reasons cited for 
M&A are the following: creating synergy between companies which is described as 
increasing the competitiveness of the merged company.138 Synergies create cash flows 
in excess of what the two companies would generate independently if they were not 
merged and therefore essentially based on the economic benefit resulting from the 
merger.139 The synergy motive has been further refined into operational and financial 
synergy.140 The former is essentially based on economies of scale whereby the merged 
firm essentially exploits the best of both companies’ manufacturing and production 
processes to reduce production costs, increase profits and thus provide the potential to 
increase its or their operating income.141 Operational synergies are also related to 
managerial efficiencies through the reduction of unnecessary managerial positions142 
and optimizing the skills and expertise of existing managers. This is related to 
diversification and cost reductions. Financial synergy, on the other hand, is premised on 
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the merger of the finances of the two companies and exploiting resultant benefits 
therefrom. With the merger of capital and cash, the firms’ insolvency ratios decrease 
while the firm’s debt capacity increases.143 The cost of capital, or the cost to obtain debt 
such as interest rates, of the combined firm is reduced owing to the reduced risk of 
insolvency and the expectation is that the combined firm will become more cost 
efficient, profitable, increase in size, and have a bigger opportunity for future profit 
maximization.144 
A second reason for M&A, as alluded to above, is achieving economies of scale. 
Economies of scale can be simply defined as producing more for less because of the 
size. It is said that the bigger a corporation is, the more efficient its inputs and labour 
can be.145 As a result of the increased quantity of goods produced, costs of production 
per unit are shared over a larger number of units thereby increasing the profits.146 Firms 
draw from operational and financial synergies to use production efficiencies, techniques, 
and know-how from one another to create a more efficient and therefore cheaper 
method and cost of production, thereby increasing output and profits.147 
A third reason suggested for M&A is the reduction of risk and diversification. Certain 
forms of diversification are said to reduce risk, for example if a firm selling or producing 
one product diversifies by acquiring a firm which produces a totally different product, the 
risk of failure of the firm is reduced in that if one product fails, there is another product to 
fall back on and all the eggs are not in one basket as it were.148 Diversification therefore 
reduces the risk and volatility associated with share prices.149 The underlying reason for 
diversification can be stock or product based, or may be targeted at labour related 
aspects whereby management and employees are diversified or placed in different roles 
to exploit possible operational synergies.  
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An important motivation for M&A activity which falls under the Behavioral theory, is the 
hubris motive.150 The premise is that acquiring firms pay higher amounts for the target 
firm above its true economic value151. In terms of the hubris theory, management of the 
acquiring company believe that they should acquire a company as they can create more 
value from the firm than its existing management. This belief is based on a hubris or 
arrogant mistake and over estimation of their ability to extract value from the acquired 
company and create value.152 This usually results in value destruction for shareholders 
and is often cited as a reason for failure of a merger or acquisition.153 
The second motivation falling under the Behavioral theory is Agency which states that 
takeovers occur as it is in the interests of the management of the acquiring company but 
at the expense of the acquiring company’s shareholders.154 Agents (managers) are paid 
to make decisions on behalf of the principal (shareholders), this payment is known as 
the agency cost.155 To align the interests of the agent with those of the principal share 
options are often granted, however, the one of the quickest ways to achieve growth is 
through M&A which could be exploited by managers to maximize their own contractual 
benefits156 as discussed earlier. These are essentially selfish and self-interested actions 
by management. In amplification of this line of argument is the fact various studies have 
a strong positive relationship between the size of the company and remuneration,157 
where some studies have even shown a stronger link between size and remuneration 
as opposed to performance and remuneration.158 
Other common reasons management may decide to enter in M&A activity include, to 
increase a firms market share with regard to specific product by acquiring a competitor, 
or acquiring a foreign company to gain access into the foreign market. Acquiring 
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companies also acquire target companies so as to acquire technology, intellectual 
property, patents or trademarks. Management may also have more malevolent reasons 
(hubris and agency) for conducting M&A activity, such as greed, empire-building, and 
the desire to establish monopolies or oligopolies and enjoy monopolistic or oligopolistic 
profits.  
In a 2009 study, Bain and Company found that up to 70% of all mergers failed, a finding 
which was also confirmed by McKinsey and Company.159 Some of the important 
reasons put forward for the failures of M&A are: firstly, the size of the premium paid (or 
overpaid) for the target companies often nullifies any positive returns as will be shown in 
the chapter on event studies.160 The second reason of great importance is the failure of 
management to efficiently integrate the organizations161 which relate to issues of the 
corporate culture differences between the two entities, incompatibility of partners, or 
inability to appropriately integrate existing employees or executives into new roles.162 
Integration was also cited by McKinsey and Company as one the main causes of failure 
of M&A. The hubris theory is also propounded as a cause for failures in that 
management is said to over-estimate their capabilities to extract or generate value, or 
over-estimate the value of their previous experience in M&A, or their ability to manage a 
diversified company or diversified products.163 Inadequate or incomplete due diligence 
on the target company, inefficient communication and planning can also result in 
failure.164 
Given that such a large percentage of M&A’s fail and that the findings of event studies, 
which are discussed in another section, also empirically prove that M&A does not create 
real value for shareholders, why do managers of companies choose to engage in M&A 
if not for reasons other than self-interested ones? Corporate governance structures fail 
to protect shareholders this regard as disclosure requirements imposed on 
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Remuneration Committees are insufficient and the formulation of remuneration of 
remuneration practices are not in keeping with international best practice. This 
insufficiency was alluded to in the chapter dealing with Remuneration Committees 
under the King Code. 
 
5. Event studies in South Africa 
Event studies can be defined as an empirical study and analysis of the behavior or 
reactions of a firm’s securities or stock prices in relation to a specific corporate event.165 
The analysis may occur over a period of days, months or years, with the general aim of 
detecting abnormal performance affecting shareholder wealth and impact of corporate 
policy decisions.166 Event studies have a long history and have been published since 
1933 and have had various subsequent applications and adaptations.167 For the 
purposes of this research, event studies that considered the change in the value of 
shares in companies for varying periods after the completion of a merger or acquisition, 
being the event, were considered. This change in the share price enables one to 
determine whether the merger created value for the shareholder, or destroyed value. 
Although not a great deal of research exists regarding the long-term impacts of merger 
and acquisition (M&A) activity on the share prices of companies in the South African 
context, a study conducted in 2004 to a large extent confirmed international findings that 
M&A activity does not create persistently positive returns over the long term168 creating 
negative returns or in the alternative no positive return. A study conducted in 2006 
similarly concluded that shareholders of acquiring companies do not earn statistically 
significant returns and described M&A activity as ‘zero net present value 
                                            
165 B. Espen Eckbo Handbook of Corporate Finance, Volume 1: Empirical Corporate Finance 1ed (2006) 
page 5. 
166 B. Espen Eckbo (2006) page 5. 
167 A. Craig MacKinlay Event Studies in Economics and Finance (1997) Vol. XXXV Journal of Economic 
Literature page 13 
168 T. Wimberley and M. Negash The Value Creation Effects of Mergers and Acquisitions: Evidence from 
the JSE Securities Exchange South Africa (2004) Vol. 59 Investment Analysts Journal page 39 
investments’,169 meaning that no significant value is created. This latter study further 
analysed the effect on the merged company’s operating financial performance and 
further differentiated between cash-funded acquisitions and share-funded acquisitions. 
A more detailed examination of these studies follows below. 
The 2004 study examined the long-term effects of M&A activity on share prices for 
companies listed on the JSE. Its point of departure is based on the premise that the 
short-term effects of M&A was proved to generally create value for shareholders in that 
the shareholders of target or acquired companies experienced abnormal gains of 
between 30% and 44%, whereas acquiring firms’ shareholders experienced gains of 
between -2% and 11%.170 This was stated to be as a result of the expectation of 
positive or improved future performance of the merged company, however the share 
price reaction obviously not indicate whether the expectation would prove to be 
correct,171 hence the need for an examination into the long-term overall effects on share 
prices from M&A activity. The authors enumerate three methodologies used in long-
term even studies as follows. Firstly, Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) which 
calculates the sum of each of the average monthly abnormal returns. Second, the Buy 
and Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR) which calculates the abnormal return over a 
specified period starting from the date of the merger ending after a specific period. 
Finally, in the Calendar Time Abnormal Returns (CTAR) ‘a portfolio is created every 
month containing all firms that completed a merger’ during a specified time comparing 
one month’s return to the previous month’s return.172 The study used companies in the 
industrial sector which entered into M&A transactions as it provided a good 
representation of M&A activity in terms of value and number of transactions over the 
decade prior to the study in South Africa.173 The study aimed to determine the effects of 
                                            
169 C. Smit and M Ward The Impact of Large Acquisition on the Share Price and Operating Financial 
Performance of Acquiring Companies Listed on the JSE (2005) Vol. 65 Investment Analysts Journal page 
13 
170 T. Wimberley and M. Negash (2004) page 31. 
171 T. Wimberley and M. Negash (2004) page 31. 
172 T. Wimberley and M. Negash (2004) page 32. 
173 T. Wimberley and M. Negash (2004) page 32. 
M&A for the period 1989 to 1998 in a total of 609 listed companies with the event 
window period being 36 months after the first announcement of the M&A.174 
In its results, the study found that at 3 months and 14 months after an M&A event, 
measured firms showed CAR’s of basically zero, meaning that no abnormal return was 
generated.175 The period between 14 and 18 months after the M&A activity remained 
neutral after the 18th month when a negative trend occurs generating negative abnormal 
returns.176 The returns remain negative until months 24 to 32 after the M&A event which 
then shows a slight positive trend, followed by another negative trend from months 32 to 
36 after the M&A event.177 At the 36th month after the M&A event, CAR’s were at its 
lowest at -10.5% and it is submitted that any abnormal positive returns recorded were 
so slight that they could not counteract the abnormal negative returns.178 
In the sensitivity analysis, the firms were further divided into value firms, neutral firms, 
and glamour firms. The former having high book to market ratios,179 and glamour firms 
having low book to market ratios. The study showed that value firms showed positive 
CAR’s in the first and third years after the M&A, whereas neutral and glamour firms 
showed consistently negative returns for the whole period.180  
Additionally the study examined the effect of M&A activity in relation to how the 
acquisition was financed. The results indicated that where a transaction was financed 
solely through share offerings, it produced negative abnormal returns for both Neutral 
and Glamour firms but not for Value firms, whereas if the transaction was cash financed 
all classifications of companies generated negative returns.181 This contradicted finding 
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in another study conducted in 1998 which found that Value firms generated positive 
returns and Glamour firms generated negative returns.182 
In conclusion the study found that M&A activity does not create persistently positive 
abnormal returns over the long-term. The largest negative return period occurs between 
the 13th and 24th month after the M&A activity, and that the method of financing the 
transaction did not have a significant impact on the overall results. The study indicated 
that for a shareholder to maximize its returns, it should release its shares in an M&A 
active firm after seven months of the announcement of an M&A event as this is the 
highest positive return period. The findings are congruent with similar research in the 
United States and the United Kingdom.183 
Later in 2005 a study was again conducted to determine whether large acquisitions 
which occurred from 2001 to 2003 created value for the shareholders of the acquiring 
companies listed on the JSE.184 The authors noted that a KPMG survey in London 
indicated that 53% of M&A destroys shareholder value.185 In this study what was 
examined was the share price performance during the period of the announcement of 
the M&A and the subsequent impact on the share price during a two year period after 
the completion of the acquisition, and secondly the impact on the operating financial 
performance of the merged company in the two years succeeding the merger.186 This 
study attempted to prove or disprove two hypotheses; first that shareholder of acquiring 
companies do not earn positive or negative abnormal cumulative returns around the 
announcement of M&A activity, considering cash and share-financed M&A.187 Second, 
that the industry adjusted cash flow returns on tangible assets of the merged company 
after the merger is the same as the average industry adjusted cash flow return on 
tangible assets of the two combined companies before the merger.188 This latter 
hypothesis was also considered for both cash and share-financed transactions. 
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The data used was obtained from the Ernst & Young annual review of M&A for the 
years 2000 to 2002, market capitalization of acquiring firms from the McGregor’s 
BFANet database, and specific financial information from the companies’ actual 
financial reports.189 The number of M&A transactions analyzed amounted to only 27. 
The first step in this study was to determine the expected return which would occur post 
acquisition. This was done using the Control Portfolio Model methodology whereby all 
listed companies were classified into eight control portfolios using ‘combinations of the 
book to market ratio discussed above, company size, and the resource effect’.190 The 
shares were then categorized into one of these eight control portfolios, the daily share 
prices of each portfolio were obtained and the daily return could be estimated, and 
rebalanced every month to maintain an accurate measure of share price returns as a 
result of changes in book to market ratios, capitalizations, new listings and delistings.191 
This was then measured and analyzed against the share price information obtained for 
specific acquisitions to determine the changes in share prices during the ten day period 
before and after the announcement of the M&A. The impact on post-acquisition cash 
flow return or operational financial performance was measured by comparing the cash 
flow returns to the median cash flow returns for the industry sector for a period of two 
years before and after the completion of the acquisition.192 
In respect of the first hypothesis regarding the impact on the share price, the study 
found a small Average Cumulative Abnormal Return over the 21 day period during the 
announcement of the acquisition and a negative return one day before and after the 
announcement of the acquisition.193 It is submitted that these positive and negative 
returns are statistically insignificant in the broader context. The study confirmed the 
results of international studies which found that share-funded acquisitions created 
negative abnormal returns whereas cash-funded acquisitions create positive abnormal 
returns over the short term.194 It is submitted that this is owing to the message that 
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share-funded acquisitions convey that the shares of the acquiring company are 
overvalued195 in that the company can offer shares in lieu of a large amount of currency. 
Cash-funded transactions on the other hand conveyed the positive message that the 
shares of the acquiring company are undervalued196 creating an incentive for investors 
to invest in the company. 
Regarding the second hypothesis, the study found that no statistically significant 
Industry-Adjusted Cash Return on Tangible Assets were recorded during the two year 
period before or after the merger. It also found no statistically significant difference 
between the results for cash-funded or share-funded transactions, however, the results 
did indicate that in general, share-funded acquisitions created a more favourable cash 
return on assets.197 Both share and cash-funded transactions produces negative cash 
returns in the second year after the merger, however these amount were statistically 
insignificant at -0.17% and -0.10% respectively.198 The overall conclusion of this study 
regarding financial performance after a merger was that M&A does not result in any 
improvement or deterioration in the operating financial performance of the merged 
company.199 This is congruent with international studies suggesting that M&A are, on 
average, zero net present value investments200 whereby when taking into account the 
premium paid for the shares of the target company or the additional amount above the 
actual market value of the shares, no additional cash flows will be generated which are 
sufficient to cover the premium paid. Secondly, M&A creates no statistically significant 
Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns in the short term, however cash-funded 
acquisitions created statistically insignificant positive returns whereas share-funded 
transactions created negative short term returns.201 
This 2005 study was supplemented in 2008 by one Kofi Kyei, who used the same 
sample as Ward and Smit in an attempt to supplement their findings that M&A does not 
create statistically significant cumulative abnormal returns, nor does it significantly 
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create or destroy shareholder value.202 The only difference this study found, compared 
to all other research in the area, regarded the method of finance of the M&A in which it 
found that share-funded M&A yielded higher positive results than cash-funded 
transactions.203 On all other aspects, the results of the study were consonant with and 
confirmed previous findings.204 
Finally the last study pertaining to the long term effects of M&A activity on share price 
performance was conducted by M Stafford in 2012, also emanating from the University 
of Pretoria’s Gordon Institute of Business Science.205 This study examined the short 
term effects of M&A activity and the long term effects by examining a considerably 
longer period of ten years (1999 to 2008) which was longer than the periods examined 
by Wimberley in 2004, Smit in 2005, and Kyei in 2008.206 Stafford tested the generation 
of Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) and Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(ACAR) over the short term and the long term, and postulated that cash versus share 
funded acquisitions generated similar ACARs over the short and long term.207 The study 
tested its hypotheses over six different event windows, a 3-day event window (-1; +1),208 
a 21-day (-10; +10), 126-day, 189-day and 229-day event window.209 
For the full duration of the study, the findings were that the Average Abnormal Returns 
(AAR) averaged 0.06%, were at its highest at 3.66% and lowest at -1.64%.210 AARs for 
cash-funded acquisitions were highest at 4.72%, lowest at -2.64% with an average of 
0.06%.211 Share-funded acquisitions AARs peaked at 3.66%, troughed at -1.64% and 
averaged at 0.03%.212 The study showed that the returns generated were all positive. 
Even though the statistics are statistically insignificant in that the AARs are so small and 
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not statistically different from zero, the findings are significant in that they are different to 
previous findings in the sense that the returns generated were numerically positive. The 
study additionally found that, contrary to all previous South African research, share-
funded acquisitions generated more positive returns than cash-funded acquisitions over 
the short term.213 The findings later conformed to previous findings over the longer term 
in this regard. Regarding ACARs, the study found statistically insignificant positive 
returns over the long term214 which supported the findings of Kyei in 2008, but 
contradicted Wimberley in 2004.215 Finally, the study found that there is no difference in 
ACARs as between cash-funded transactions or share-funded transactions over the 
short or long-term and that both produced similar statistically insignificant positive 
returns.216  
When comparing the results of event studies of foreign jurisdictions, it is important to 
note the observations of Stafford (2012) who differentiated between studies in the 
Developed world or Developed economies and the Developing world or economies.217 
Although South Africa is a Developing country, it is submitted that its ‘financial markets 
and institutions are more akin to those which prevail in the Developed World’.218 The 
majority of international event studies are geared towards measuring the abnormal 
returns over short term intervals around the period of the announcement or conclusion 
of a merger or acquisition. The reason why most international studies are short term 
studies is as a result of the reliance on the economic theory of the ‘efficient market’219. 
This theory states that the ‘share price of a company should almost immediately adjust 
to include the effects of the M&A announcement’220 and that the share price as reflected 
immediately after the transaction should provide the investor with a reliable prediction of 
the future benefit of the M&A.221 The studies in international studies concluded that 
M&A transactions on average created no value in that the share prices either increased 
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or decreased immaterially after the announcement of an acquisition.222 Studies from the 
Developing world had diametrically opposed results which stated that M&A does create 
value for the shareholders over the short term and long term.223 Stafford suggested that 
reasons for the differing results are the different institutional environments and the 
different attitudes towards mergers and acquisitions in Developing countries, where the 
shareholders of acquiring companies regard acquisitions as positive whereas 
shareholders of target companies hold the opposite view.224 
It is clear that the studies conducted internationally, and indeed locally, bear a basket of 
mixed fruits. No two studies have generated findings so certain that one could 
definitively state that M&A activity creates or destroys shareholder value, or that 
financing M&A through cash or shares will result in greater returns. The one finding 
which can undoubtedly be deemed as a common denominator in all studies is that the 
AARs and ACARs, whether positive or negative, are statistically insignificant. Put 
differently, the positive or negative returns made, if any, are of such a small amount that 
they are inconsequential. The same holds true for the converse. The overall results of 
the studies conducted in South Africa were more congruent with the studies of the 
Developed world, as suggested by Stafford (2012), in that in the period after the 
announcement or conclusion of merger or acquisition there are small gains, however 
there is more evidence that M&A does not create value over long term. 
 
6. Summation and Recommendations 
From the aforegoing, the following summation is proffered: the basic goal of the 
directors is to make the make the company successful.225 The directors stand in a 
fiduciary relationship to the company and have a fiduciary duty towards the company 
which are based on notions of loyalty, good faith and avoidance of conflicts of interests 
as espoused in English law.226 The duties of a director were codified in Section 76 of the 
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Companies Act of 2008. The best interests of the ‘company’227 has been ascribed the 
common-law meaning as referring to the ‘interests of the collective body or present and 
future shareholders’.228 This relationship between the director and the shareholders can 
further be classified as an Agent-Principal relationship whereby the directors, act as 
agents of the shareholders as principals. The agency theory further suggests that a 
conflict of interest arises in that the agent acts in his own interests as opposed to the 
interests of the shareholder, known as the agency problem. The method suggested to 
mitigate this problem is through agent’s remuneration package, known as the agency 
cost. This forms the basis of the remuneration of directors of companies and informs the 
structure of the remuneration package. 
Modern South African corporate governance structures do provide relatively sufficient 
regulation and guidance as to how to mitigate this agency problem. It provides that 
Remuneration Committees should be formed to determine remuneration packages for 
directors with the aim of aligning the interests of the directors with those of the 
shareholders through short and long term incentives, and to prepare disclosure of 
certain remuneration related information.229 It is submitted that in the ordinary course of 
business, these recommendations would suffice. It is in the context of Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A) where the recommendations of the King Code et al begin to fall 
short. 
Mergers and Acquisitions are defined as a transaction or transactions whereby one 
company is acquired by another resulting in one surviving or a new merged company. 
M&A are considered to be one of the fastest ways to achieve growth in a company and 
the reasons for entering into M&A are vast and plentiful. However, having regard to the 
fiduciary duty of directors owed to the shareholders, one would expect the main reason 
to be in the best interests of the shareholders and consequently to create shareholder 
value. One of theories suggested for entering into M&A is the Agency Theory, which as 
stated above suggests that managers act in their own interests. It is submitted that this 
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is the most likely reason for entering into M&A activity as positive links have been found 
between company size and director remuneration.230 The most convincing evidence that 
the Agency Theory is responsible for M&A is that of Event Studies. These are studies 
which analyze the fluctuations of share prices of companies around the occurrence of 
certain events. Two types of event studies are usually conducted, being those that 
consider only the price movements upon the announcement of M&A, and secondly 
those that consider the long term price movements after M&A. The results of these 
studies found that real shareholder value is not created by M&A for a period of at least 
three years after the conclusion of the M&A transaction. The studies showed that any 
gains over the short term were not significant and not abnormal as from what would 
normally be expected. These local research findings are congruent with the findings of 
studies conducted in foreign jurisdictions and are a well-documented phenomenon. The 
results also provide valuable arguments against the conventional suggested reasons for 
M&A activity. 
The questions which may be put are: Why is this a Corporate Governance issue? If 
shareholder value is eventually created, why is this controversial? To answer the first 
question regard must be had to the purpose of corporate governance being to 
supplement enacted corporate legislation, improve leadership, increase corporate 
citizenry, and to improve accountability and transparency.231 Another definition of 
corporate governance in the U.S. context is the ‘collection of control mechanisms that 
an organization adopts to prevent or dissuade potentially self-interested managers from 
engaging in activities detrimental to the welfare of the shareholders and 
stakeholders’.232 The issue identified in this dissertation exposes a weakness in the 
corporate governance structure in that through M&A activity directors may receive a 
three-fold benefit, which answers the second question. The first benefit being an 
increase in salary as a result of the increase in size of the company. The second being 
short term benefits from increased performance of the company which it is submitted 
cannot be attributed to the actions or performance of a director but flow as a natural 
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consequence of M&A, and consequently a director should not be rewarded for any 
improved performance related to M&A. And, thirdly, the director will be rewarded 
through long term incentive schemes once the share price of the company rises after 
the estimated three year period. This is in stark contrast to the shareholder only 
benefiting after an estimated period of three years later by gaining an increase in 
dividend. If the purpose of corporate governance is to prevent self-interested conduct 
and protect shareholders from such conduct, it certainly fails in this regard. The Practice 
Notes of the King Code do warm Remuneration Committees to consider the impact of 
merger announcements on the share prices when rewarding directors.233 This illustrates 
that the drafters of the Code are cognizant of the fact that M&A announcements have 
an impact on share prices, but have failed to consider the long term impacts after the 
completion of an M&A transaction. 
The only statutory disclosure requirements in South African law is provided in section 
30(4)-(6) of the Companies Act.234 These sections define remuneration and state what 
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(6)  For the purposes of subsections (4) and (5), remuneration‟ includes- 
(a)  fees paid to directors for services rendered by them to or on behalf of the company, including any 
amount paid to a person in respect of the person’s accepting the office of director; 
(b)  salary, bonuses and performance-related payments; 
(c)  expense allowances, to the extent that the director is not  required to account for the allowance; 
needs to be disclosed, of relevance being bonuses and performance-related payments. 
As statutory compliance with disclosure provisions would be relatively simple, they were 
of necessity supplemented and expanded upon by the King Code as the statutory 
provisions provided no guidance as to how to determine the remuneration, or how 
disclosure is to be made. The recommendations of King Code assisted a great deal in 
guiding the determination, consideration, and disclosure of director remuneration, 
however, at the core they remain merely recommendations. As the King Code is based 
on the voluntary ‘apply or explain’ approach, and the Code makes a clear distinction 
between statutory provisions which ‘must’ be applied and those that ‘should’ or ‘may’ be 
applied,235 the directors can choose not to apply a principle if they believe it to be in the 
best interests of the company but they must explain why.236 All of the provisions, but for 
those provisions of section 30(4)-(6) of the Companies Act, relating to Remuneration 
Committees and the disclosure of remuneration information fall into this ‘should’ 
category and can consequently theoretically be ignored. The fact that 24% of all 
companies listed on the JSE chose not to apply the recommendations of the King 
Code237 is evidence that the system is not as effective as it may purport to be. This fact 
should be a cause concern as ineffective remuneration systems have been described 
as a key factor and cause of the global financial crisis by the OECD238 and UNCTAD.239 
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And, secondly, given the large benefits directors receive at the expense of 
shareholders, the fact that it need not be disclosed is clearly not in the interests of 
shareholders and should be disclosed to shareholders. The fact that such non-
disclosure cannot possibly be determined to be in the best interests of the shareholders 
would render any ‘explanation’ insufficient and could be contrary to Section 76(3)(b) of 
the Companies Act and the director’s common law fiduciary duty towards the company. 
Having identified the problem and areas of concern, what follows are recommendations 
as can be found in recent international best practice. 
International trends indicate that the larger economies such as the United States, the 
United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Canada have opted for mandatory statutory 
provisions regarding remuneration committees and specifically disclosure. The United 
Kingdom was the most recent to follow in instituting statutory disclosure requirements in 
the Large and Medium-sized Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) 
(Amendment) Regulations 2013 which came into effect on 1 October 2013.240 Although 
these requirements, amoung others, are statutory, the UK Corporate Governance Code 
is applied on a voluntary ‘comply or explain’ basis. The King Committee argued that 
even though the US codified the majority of its governance code,241 this forced 
compliance failed to prevent the precipitation of the financial crisis, costs too much, and 
the ‘one size fits all’ approach is not suitable.242 The hybrid system of the UK, on the 
other hand, provides a good balance between forcing compliance and allowing the 
system to develop in a rapid enough fashion to cater for the changing commerce and 
governance landscape. Although this is true also in the South African context with 
protracted legislative processes, it is necessary to codify some aspects of the King 
Code as has been done in the current Companies Act with regards to King I and King II. 
This necessity is illustrated by the fact that 24% of companies listed on the JSE do not 
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comply with any of the King Code recommendations.243 The fact that director 
remuneration is such a contentious issue,244 the benefits which could be earned by 
directors, coupled with large percentage of non-compliance, some compulsory 
remuneration and disclosure requirements would be prudent. 
The King Code requires that only a ‘majority’ of the members sitting on a remuneration 
committee should be independent, however other jurisdictions such as the US and UK 
prefer to have fully independent remuneration committees.245 This increases the 
independence of the committee and also allows for more objective reviews of annual 
remuneration packages. Another international trend is that shareholders should have a 
binding vote or at least an increased ‘say on pay’ as is illustrated by the UK’s246 2013 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act which requires a binding shareholder vote for the 
remuneration policy and even creates a civil offence and statutory claim against a 
company for payments made contrary to the remuneration policy.247 Such amendments 
in South Africa would greatly increase the role that shareholders play as they have 
minimal non-binding vote to approve a Remuneration Report, which could not be 
created by a possibly non-existent remuneration committee, with no consequence. Such 
provisions should obviously be geared towards the South African business context. 
Certain alterations could be made regarding the approach to M&A, additional provision 
of information and disclosure in the King Code. For M&A, the Companies Act248 requires 
approval by a special resolution at a meeting called for that purpose249 at which meeting 
shareholders are provided with a copy of the Merger Agreement.250 The contents of the 
Merger Agreement are dealt with fully in Section 113(2) of the Act and includes 
information relating to the terms and means of effecting the merger. The Practice Note 
on Fundamental and Affected Transactions251 only deals with the conduct of directors 
                                            
243 CJ van Vuuren (2013) page 4. 
244 Dr. F Theunissen (2010) page 2. 
245 D Larker (2011) page 39. 
246 Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 – Part 6 
247 Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 – Part 6 S226B – S226E 
248 Companies Act 2008 – section 113(5) and 115. 
249 Companies Act 2008 – section 115(2)(a) 
250 Companies Act 2008 – section 113(5)(a) 
251 King Committee, King III Practice Notes: Introduction & Background to Fundamental and Affected 
Transaction (2009) 
regarding conflicts of interest and conduct of offeree companies. The only other 
reference the Code et al makes to M&A are in the Practice Notes on Remuneration in 
Practice Note 166.1 as stated above. The Committee should supplement the 
information in the Code regarding M&A and should contain the following 
recommendations to be implemented by companies: firstly, that in addition to the 
information presented in the Merger Agreement, the Risk Committee (if the company 
has one) or alternatively the Board should prepare an estimate as to when expected 
positive returns on shares will be expected, in light of research findings as elucidated 
above regarding the differing periods of return. Secondly, a statement of an analysis of 
the company classifying it into one of three types of firms which enter into M&A, namely 
Value, Neutral, or Glamour firms. These classifications were dealt with in the chapter on 
event studies, where Value firms have high book-to-market ratios and Glamour firms 
have low book-to-market ratios and the former generating earlier returns. Given such 
information, it is submitted that the Special Resolutions required to enter into M&A will 
be more difficult to attain. This would have a trickle-down effect and have an impact on 
other facets such as the annual review of the remuneration policy. It is submitted that if 
shareholders were granted a binding vote in determining the remuneration policy in light 
of the information disclosed with regards to M&A, the determination of short and long 
term incentives would be subject to a great deal more scrutiny in the eyes of the 
shareholder. 
Finally, when companies enter into M&A, this should be specifically addressed at the 
annual review of the Remuneration Policy. Information which should be disclosed to 
shareholders should include the expected increase in salary of the directors (if any) on 
account of the increase in size, the increase in output, sales, and economies of scale 
and any factors of relevance which could be related to short or long term incentives. 
This should be viewed in light of the actual performance of the directors against the 
consequences which flow naturally from M&A. This information should be readily 
available if a thorough due diligence was performed. The link between the M&A and the 
short and long term performance indicators should be illustrated so as to allow 
shareholders to consider and vote on the gains which may accrue to directors in light of 
their own shareholder return.  
It is the submission of this dissertation that the corporate governance structures as they 
stand do not allow for the above information to come to light. As a consequence, 
shareholders, especially institutional investors, cannot exercise their control over 
directors effectively and are prejudiced by the status quo whereas directors benefit 
excessively. It is evident from international trends that disclosure is becoming more 
mandatory and that certain aspects of corporate governance are being made 
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